A majority
of the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the chairman of the
Industrial Commission should not have appointed arbitrators to temporary
fill two permanent vacancies on a Commission panel. Rather, the Workers’
Compensation Act mandated that the two vacancies be filled by
appointments of the governor "by and with the consent of the Senate."
Claimant
alleged he injured his back while lifting a kiln at defendant’s candy
factory. The arbitrator awarded 57-6/7 weeks of temporary total
disability, $7,828 in medical expenses and additional compensation
pursuant to Sections 16, 19K) and 19(l). Defendant appealed to the
Commission.
The case was
assigned to a panel consisting of Commissioners John Hallock Jr., Barry
Ketter and Linzey Jones. However, before the matter was heard and
decided, Commissioner Hallock was promoted to chairman and Commissioner
Jones resigned following a medical leave of absence. Hallock, in his
capacity as the new Commission chairman, appointed a succession of
arbitrators to temporarily fill the two vacancies left by himself and
Jones.
The
Commission panel consisting of Commissioners Ketter, Kane and Reichart
limited the arbitrator’s TTD award to 14-5/7 weeks and vacated the
awards of additional compensation and medical expenses. The Circuit
Court of Cook County confirmed the decision of the Commission.
On appeal,
claimant argued the Commission’s decision was void because the panel
that rendered it was illegally constituted. He also argued, in the
alternative, that the Commission’s findings as to causal connection, TTD,
medical expenses and additional compensation were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In a decision reported at 8 ILWCLB 2036, the
Appellate Court of Illinois-1st District rejected both arguments and
affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.
A majority
of the Ilinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate and Circuit Court
and remanded to the Commission, holding that the WCA mandates in a
fiding that two of three commissioners who sat on the panel reviewing
claimant’s case were not appointed in conformity with statutory
requirements. Chief Justice Moses explained that under Section 13 of the
WCA, responsibility for appointing commissioners and for filling
vacancies in the office of commissioner is vested in the governor "by
and with the consent of the Senate." If the vacancy occurs while the
Senate is in recess, the governor is empowered to make a temporary
appointment until the next meeting of the Senate, at which time he is to
nominate a person to fill the position. In the instant case, these
procedures were not followed. Instead, Chairman Hallock appointed
arbitrators to temporarily fill the vacancies.
The chief
justice noted there is authority under Section 13 of the WCA for the
chairman to designate an arbitrator to serve as an acting commissioner
for up to six months, but that authority is reserved for situations
where the sitting commissioner remains in office but "is or will be
unavailable to fulfill [his or her] responsibilities." The chief justice
explained that this was inapplicable to the appointments replacing
Chairman Hallock because he was never "unable to fulfill the
responsibilities of his office." He vacated his office completely upon
being promoted. In addition, once Commissioner Jones’ absence was due to
his resignation, rather than a medical leave, his responsibilities could
also not be performed by an arbitrator, appointed by the chairman.
Instead it was up to the governor to appoint a replacement by and with
consent of the Senate.
Next, Chief
Justice Harrison determined the effect of the absence of statutory
authority, and therefore, was without jurisdiction. As a result, its
actions were void and the decision is rendered invalid.
The chief
justice went on to reject the Commission’s claim that the decision could
be validated based on the doctrine recognizing de facto public officers.
This doctrine prevents third parties or members of the public from
raising collateral challenges to a public officer’s qualifications to
hold office if considerations of public policy require the officer’s
acts to be considered valid. The chief justice explained that no
considerations of public policy militate in favor of preventing workers’
compensation claimants from challenging the legal status of the
commissioners who passed on their claims where, as here, the challenge
is raised on direct review of the award and the commissioners were
appointed in a manner that threatens the WCA’s basic objectives.
In a
specially concurring opinion, Justice McMorrow, joined by Justice
Freeman, explained that although claimant did not question the validity
of the panel of Commissioners when he appeared before that tribunal, he
did so when the case was in the appellate court. Therefore, claimant’s
untimeliness in raising the issue did not convert the case into a
collateral proceeding. Furthermore, the justice continued, although
issues not raised before an administrative agency are generally
considered waived, voidness in a fundamental defect that cannot be
waived by a failure to object. Whether there is a lack of jurisdiction
which renders a judgment void is a matter which can be raised at any
time.
Turning to
the merits, Justice McMorrow explained he agreed with Chief Justice
Harriso’s interpretation of the WCA. However, he did not agree with the
chief justice as to the consequences which must follow from this
conclusion. The justice contended that the decisions rendered by the
replacement commissioners may be afforded defacto validity pursuant to
the de facto officer doctrine. However the justice contended equities in
the instant case, on balance, militate against application of the de
facto office doctrine. The fact claimant successfully argued that the
manner in which commissioners were being appointed was contrary to
statute and this court found that the practice, if it continued, had the
potential to undermine the WCA’s basic objectives, tips the balance in
claimant’s favor and against application of the de facto doctrine,
Justice McMorrow argued. Accordingly, under the particular circumstances
of this case, claimant should be granted a remand so that a properly
constituted panel of commissioners can review the arbitrator’s award.
Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Fitzgerald and Justice Garman, argued the
court lacked jurisdiction over the instant case. The dissent contended
that because the factual basis for the claim was never litigated and is
found nowhere in the record on appeal, the issue is therefore waived.
The dissent further contended that claimant’s arguments constituted an
impermissible collateral attack. In addition, the dissent pointed out
that the plurality in fact invalidates "this and every other decision of
the Commission" in which the replacement commissioners participated.
